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BOOK REVIEWS
TYRANNY ON TRIAL, by Whitney R. Harris, Dallas, Texas:
Southern Methodist University Press, 1954. Pp. 648. 47
illustrations, $6.00.
The Nuremberg War Crime Trials can be analyzed under at
least four possible viewpoints: a military, a political, a legal, and
a historical one.
Some have defended, and others have attacked the fact that at
Nuremberg the victors sat in judgment over the vanquished. The
Nuremberg Trials have been hailed as an incentive to peace, and
condemned as a cause for greater destructiveness of any future
war. They have been called milestones in the development, and
perversions, of international law. They have, finally, been praised
for providing the most complete source material ever collected
for students of history, only to be blamed by others for slanted
and non-objective reporting.
It is the great merit of Mr. Harris in his book "Tyranny on
Trial" to have provided, in a handy volume, the material for constructive discussion of the Nuremberg Trials under these, or any
other view points.
Mr. Harris has confined himself to the record of the first and
probably most important case before Nuremberg Tribunals, that
against Goering, et al. This limitation can be accepted because of
the fundamental character of that first case.
Mr. Harris gives some substantial material on the potentially
military aspect of the Nuremberg Trials. His book has some good
arguments against it, in Mr. Justice Jackson's introduction to the
book:
Chief Justice Stone, who had his own personal reasons for disliking
the trial, writing about "the power of the victor over the vanquished"

BOOK REVIEWS

1954]

said, "It would not disturb me greatly if that power were openly and
frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a bad lot, but it
disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the habiliments of the common law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with
crime." (Mason, "Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief
Justice Stone," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193.) It is hard to find a statement
by a law-trained man more inconsistent with the requirements of elementary justice. When did it become a crime to be one of a "bad lot"?
What was the specific badness for which they should be openly and
frankly punished? And how did he know what individuals were included in the bad lot? Can it be less right to punish for specific acts
such as murder, which has been a crime since the days of Adam, then
to punish on the vague charge always made against an enemy that he is
"bad"? If it would have been right to punish the vanquished out-ofhand for being a bad lot, what made it wrong to have first a safeguarded
hearing to make sure who was bad, and how bad, and of what his badness consisted ?1
A pertinent political lesson of the Trials is stated by the author
on page 16:
The leaders of Hitler's Germany are discredited, and Western Germany stands with the free world against a tyranny of a different kind.
What was learned at Nuremberg about the methods and objectives of
despotic men can serve us well in evaluating our relations with the
Soviet regime. For tyranny is not a product of nations or of races, but
of men.
The law of the Nuremberg Trials is, on pp. 461 et seq., somewhat summarily stated. This part, too, is well done, though, and
is adequate in view of the intended, and desirable, appeal of the
book to everybody, not only to the lawyer or historian.
It is not, and was hardly intended to be, a treatise on, or even
a full summary of, the "Nuremberg law." Little can be found in
this book on th6 standard Nuremberg defense of "superior
orders," though this aspect of the Nuremberg Trials is one that
has interested Americans generally, and American soldiers specifically, more than any other aspect of the "Nuremberg law." The
I
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author, probably rightly, sees the greatest contribution of the
Nuremberg Trials to international law in their precedent-setting
effect. But the old function of punishment, the quia peccatum est
and the ne peccetur could perhaps have been more strongly
emphasized.
As a sourcebook, Mr. Harris' opus is dependable. In 500
pages, he gives the substance of literally thousands of pages of
testimony and of documentary evidence. It will be difficult to find
elsewhere as much compact horror as in his chapters on "The
Murder Marts" and the "The Einsatz Groups," 2 and the anatomy
of military aggression has rarely been as tensely described as in
Chapter 6 et seq, dealing with the Nazi attacks on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and so on.
The overall importance of this book becomes evident when it
is contrasted with Veale's "Advance to Barbarism" which, unfortunately and undeservedly, has become an "intellectual" and
political force in this country. Veale says of the Nuremberg trials:'
Except to students of the customs, practices, beliefs, and ideas of
primitive man, the details of this unique trial need not concern anyone who values his time.
Veale speaks of "Nuremberg with its collection of foreign hangmen." 4 The object of the Nuremberg Trials, according to Veale,
was "not to ascertain the truth but to secure a conviction." 5 Mr.
Harris' book is a very necessary and a very competent refutation
of this and other errors.

Edwin M. Sears.*

2 Chapters

25 and 26.
8 Veale "Advance to Barbarism," p. 2.
4 1d. at 79.
5 Id. at 149.
*Member of the Colorado Bar; Instructor, Denver University Law School.
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MOORE' FEDERAL PRACTICE, SECOND EDITION, VOLUME

6.

By James Wm. Moore. Albany, New York: Mathew Bender & Company, 1953.
Pp. xvii, 4055. $18.50.

Professor James Wm. Moore of the Yale University School of
Law, is well known to the Federal Court practitioner because of
his profound knowledge of Federal practice and his ability to
organize the vast material on the subject into a usable treatise.
The Sixth Volume of the Second Edition continues Professor
Moore's treatment of the Federal Rules begun in the Second
Volume and covers Rule 54 Judgments, Costs; Rule 55 Default;
Rule 56 Summary Judgment; Rule 57 Declaratory Judgments;
Rule 58 Entry of Judgment; Rule 59 New Trials, Amendment of
Judgments; and Rule 60 Relief from Judgment or Order. In
general the official rule is stated, followed by the history of the
rule, committee notes, discussion of the relationship to other
rules, changes made to the rules since originally promulgated, if
any, and a detailed discussion of the various provisions of the
rule. The paragraphs of the text are geared to the rules so as to
facilitate the use of the material, and the text is divided into short
balanced essays arranged in logical order. The treatise contains
Professor Moore's opinions as to the probable judicial interpretation of the various provisions of the rules. The problems relating to
the rules are recognized and practical information and advice are
supplied throughout the volume for the proponents of either side
of the question. The volume is very comprehensive and the text
supported by cross references and citations to Federal Rules
Service as well as the official reports. There are numerous quotations from cases; the cases are evaluated by Professor Moore,
and the comments on the cases are coordinated with the text.
Because of the particular rules covered by this volume it would
seem to the reviewer that the volume would be of special interest
and assistance to the practitioner. In the discussion of Rule 54,
Judgments, Costs, the problem of finality is thoroughly discussed.
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The jurisdictional statutes and the other related sections of the
United States Code are stated and considered in connection with
the problem. Such subjects as direct appeals from the District
Courts to the Supreme Court, bankruptcy appeals, interlocutory
appeals in injunction, receivership, patent and admiralty proceedings and the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651, are exhaustively covered in a very scholarly manner.
Because of the increased use of the relatively new motion for
summary judgment and declaratory judgment procedure, this
volume should be especially helpful. In addition to Professor
Moore's general treatment of the rule on summary judgments,
Rule 56, there is a very extensive discussion of the materials on
which the motion may be heard which will aid the attorney in preparing the motion and in determining the support required and
that available in his particular case. Over 100 pages of the discussion of this rule are devoted to the summary judgment in
particular actions and on particular issues. This discussion of the
rule applied to particular actions and issues, together with the
authorities cited, and Professor Moore's evaluation and comments
on the cases should serve as a valuable guide both to the attorney
for the movant and the respondent.
Professor Moore does not limit his discussion of declaratory
judgments to Rule 57 which makes reference to the procedure for
obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C.,
Sec. 2201, but gives a complete discussion of this rule and of the
Declaratory Judgment Act. The constitutionality of declaratory
judgments, purposes of the Act and the rule, and judicial discretion are all thoroughly covered. Once again, Professor Moore
gives in his discussion of this rule and of the related statute an
application of the general principles of justiciability and the exercise of judicial discretion to render or to refuse to render a
declaratory judgment in various types of cases, including tax
cases, insurance cases, patents, trade marks and copy rights, etc.
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As evidence of the practical use to which this volume may be put,
the procedural aspects of the declaratory judgment proceeding
are set forth in detail.
The value of this treatise, not only for research and a guide
to practice, but as an authority within itself, is shown by the
fact that the Federal Courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have cited this treatise as an authority. Above all, the
treatise is thorough and scholarly, and is a recommended as a
complete guide to practice.
Morris Harrell.*

*B.B.A., LLB., Baylor University; membe

of the Dallas Bar.

